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China’s Cleantech Landscape:
The Renewable Energy Technology Paradox
by Federico Caprotti*

C

Introduction: China’s Renewable
Energy Technology Paradox1

leantech is playing an increasingly important role as a
sector of investment on the international scale, attracting $8.4 billion in the North American, European,
Chinese, and Indian markets in 2008.2 This represents a thirtyeight percent increase on the $6.1 billion invested in cleantech
in 2007 in the same markets.3
Within cleantech, arguably the
most important area, or sub-sector, of investment is renewable
energy technologies and generation systems, which account for
over thirty percent of cleantech
investment flows.4 However,
the role of renewable energy
technologies at the national
scale is also increasing in importance. This article focuses on
China, where the development
of renewable energy sources is
crucial to energy security and
to providing alternatives to the
carbon economy, which is currently generating many environmental externalities. Renewable
energy technology development
and manufacturing also provide
clear opportunities for the Chinese central government to promote a domestic technology manufacturing base, and to achieve China’s 2020 energy generation
targets, as will be shown below. Therefore, renewable energy
technology will play an increasingly important role in China’s
energy landscape. At the present time, renewable energy is both
a current generation reality and a future technology opportunity: by 2005, renewable energy provided eight percent of the
country’s total energy consumption and sixteen percent of its
total electricity output.5 This is expected to more than double
by 2020.6
At the same time, research reveals that the Chinese renewable energy technology market presents a paradox: a market of
opportunity based on a need for the development of generating
capacity from renewable sources, coupled with the existence
of policy, fiscal, and technological obstacles which hamper the
potential of China’s cleantech market in renewable energies.
China is depicted as a leading cleantech market in the short to

medium term, especially in renewable energy technology, project infrastructure, and manufacturing.
However, many researchers have also highlighted the problems which seemingly go hand in hand with China’s status as a
predominant emergent renewables market in the short term, and
as a projected market leader in the next five to ten years. These
issues are not only restricted to the renewables business; they
extend across the wider political and cultural context, bringing to
light the importance of a network
approach to renewable energy
technology development, manufacturing, and deployment. In
short, China’s renewable energy
market presents an opportunity
with clear challenges. The following provides an analysis of
the main obstacles facing and
currently affecting the renewable energy market in China.

Changes in import duties
need to be stable in
order to truly promote
technology transfer into
China; fiscal policy
stability aids foreign
technology businesses’
long-range strategy
and planning.

Spring 2009

Obstacles: Policy, Tax,
and Long-Term Market
Development

Energy landscapes can be
uneven landscapes. This can
be due to a variety of factors.
However, above all, the existence of obstacles to the development of cleantech landscapes
in a national context can mostly be related to policy, fiscal, and
economic issues which can be deeply local. At the same time,
global economic influences—both at the firm level and at the
level of international economic policies—intersect with national
regulatory and technology landscapes to constitute a complex
environment in which clean energy technologies develop. China’s cleantech landscape, and specifically its renewable energy
market, is an example of the interplay of these forces. The following highlights some of the main issues facing the renewable
energy market in the country today, focusing on energy pricing
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policy, technology transfer, private investment, and the need
for emphasis on energy conservation as well as monitoring and
evaluation.

Pricing Policy Shortfalls
China’s 2006 Renewable Energy Law attempts, among
other things, to set pricing standards for energy generated from
renewable energy sources.7 The law’s broad aims are to increase
the capacity generated from
renewables in the country, and
are part of a wider national strategy aimed at increasing power
supply as well as diversifying
the generating base, as a result
of rising demand and a need
for energy security.8 The law’s
renewable energy pricing mechanisms are based on “feed-in”
tariff models of the kind applied
to European energy markets;9
however, the link between pricing at source and grid distribution in China is proving problematic.10 This is largely because utility companies have, in many
cases, little incentive to connect a renewable energy project, such
as a wind farm, to the grid. Once such projects are connected,
utilities are required to purchase power generated by the projects; the price for renewables-generated power is higher than for
coal-generated power, generally due to government-mandated
subsidies and tariff levels (which are aimed at generating project revenue as well as paying off interest and loan principals
required to build renewables projects in the first place).11 Therefore, the current renewable energy landscape—especially in the
case of wind power—features a backlog of completed projects
which are not actually connected to the grid.12

For example, from 1990 to 1995, import duties were largely
non-existent as the central government attempted to stimulate
partnerships and technology transfer to develop a wind power
base for the country.14 By 1996, the government’s strategic
focus had shifted to the development of a domestic, national,
and localized wind turbine manufacturing market. In order to
stimulate domestic manufacturers, the government levied duties
on foreign wind technology imports. The imposition of duties
was reversed again in 1998, and
a robust domestic manufacturing market is indeed developing: between 2003 and 2005,
local wind turbine production
rose from $26 to $104 million.15
However, during the same
period, the share of imported
turbine technology rose from
$35.9 to $211.9 million.16
Uncertainty remains over
the instability of import duties
and other taxes on foreign technology imports: for example, in
April 2008, the central government changed the import context
again by refunding value added tax (“VAT”) on imported turbine components; this tax refund was backdated to the start of
2008.17 While this specific measure is aimed at easing the cost of
importing wind technology to China, it also inhibits the development of domestic wind turbine manufacturing by providing
incentives for importing essential components. Furthermore,
changes in import duties need to be stable in order to truly promote technology transfer into China; fiscal policy stability aids
foreign technology businesses’ long-range strategy and planning. For example, the VAT rebate measure was accompanied
by the cancellation of China’s tariff-free policy for foreign turbine units with a capacity of less than 2.5 megawatts (“MW”).
Although this is in keeping with the central aim of building wind
farms with a generating capacity of not less than 100 MW,18 the
resulting shifting import duty and tax landscape is not conducive
to transparent cost pricing for importers, domestic manufacturers and, indeed, wind project developers.

Uncertainty over power
prices hinders the inflow
of capital focused on
renewable energy projects.

Technology Transfer: Uncertainty Over Import
Tariffs
Uncertainty also exists over the stability of China’s current
import duties on renewable energy technology and associated
machine components. This uncertainty is an especially important
factor in hampering already established technologies like wind
turbines. For example, ninety-seven percent of large-scale (nonmicro) wind turbines currently installed in China are imported
(this includes components).13 The Chinese government’s import
duty strategy for wind technology has varied widely since the
dawn of large-scale wind generation in 1986, alternatively
imposing high and virtually non-existent taxes (see Figure 1).

Private Investment Shortfalls
At present, wind power technology and project development in China could be improved by enabling more investment
from private sources (see discussion of development needs
above). Government subsidies and preferential loan systems
exist, but uncertainty over power prices hinders the inflow of
capital focused on renewable energy projects. In this respect, the

Figure 1: Timeline of shifting import duties and taxes on foreign technology imports.
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Chinese renewable energy technology market is markedly different from other, more established renewables markets such as
in European countries or the United States:
[P]rivate investment has become the predominant force
in wind farm construction in other countries. For example, around ninety-five percent of investment in wind
farms was contributed by the private sector in India . . . ;
However, unless a new investment mechanism with
incentive policies and regulations is established [in
China], and more financial channels are opened up, it
[will] be difficult to realize the target of wind energy
development.19

A Decline in Energy Conservation Investment
From the point of view of sustainability discourse and policy,
national and regional efforts to promote sustainability in China
cannot be seen as separate from efforts to improve energy conservation capabilities. China is currently adding the equivalent
of a 2,000 MW coal-fired power plant to its generating capacity
every week, and has been doing so since around 2000.20 This
represents a large annual rise in the amount of fossil-fuel generated power, and a resultant rise in environmental externalities.
In 2004, for example, the amount of energy capacity added to
China’s generation system was roughly equivalent to the amount
of energy generated in the whole of Spain or California.21 At the
same time generating capacity has increased on the mainland,
there has been an increased focus
on renewable energy sources,
especially hydroelectric, wind,
and lately, solar power. However, this double trend—large
incremental rises in generation
capacity based on fossil fuels,
and a rising interest in renewable
energy sources—has been paralleled by a decrease in investment
in energy conservation projects.
This has led to the paradoxical
situation that, from 1980 to 2000,
China benefited from an energy
supply surplus; since 2000, even
with the added capacity, China
has suffered from increasing
energy shortages. Indeed, Jiang
Lin, a China energy researcher at
the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory in Berkeley, California, has recently argued that
“support and policy commitments to energy conservation in
China have weakened considerably during China’s transition to
a more market-based economy.”22

have been commissioned and progressed past the project stage.
In particular, recent research has pointed to the need to include
user perspectives both in terms of the efficacy of new energy
technologies, and their wider socio-cultural acceptability within
particular contexts.23 The adoption of effective monitoring and
evaluation (“M&E”) programs can in turn be seen as a solution
to the lack of connections from renewables projects to the grid.
This is because effective M&E programs can be constructed
around a set of key indicators—
such as the number of projects
connected to the grid, or a series
of connections over a specific
time span—which clearly track
progress. However, underlying
grid connection issues, such as
electricity pricing and subsidies
as well as incentives for utilities
to connect renewable generation capacity to the grid, have to
be resolved before M&E can be
effectively applied.

China features several
leading solar power
and photovoltaic
manufacturing and project
companies, active in the
domestic as well as in
the international
cleantech field.

Monitoring, Evaluation, and User Perspectives
A wider issue, applicable across all renewable energy markets, is the need for consistent, transparent, and precise monitoring and evaluation of renewable energy projects after they
Spring 2009

Obstacles or
Challenges?

These factors constitute a
very real threat not to the development of China’s renewable
energy landscape, but to its
progress. It would, in fact, be unrealistic to forecast a stalling of
the Chinese renewables market, especially after the passing of
the 2006 Renewable Energy Law and considering the number
of projects still in the pipeline. Furthermore, the current project pipeline may provide a temporal buffer—a year at most—
in terms of project development, which could help offset the
negative effects of the current credit crisis and oil price declines
on the renewable energy spectrum, from research and develop-
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ment (“R&D”) expenditure to project development and grid
connections.
The main risks posed by the obstacles identified above lie,
instead, in the friction which could be exerted on the Chinese
renewables technology market. This friction can be expressed in
terms of slower growth in what is a dynamic and fast-developing
market; erratic policy interventions, ineffective pricing
mechanisms, and other factors
can be seen as draining the Chinese market of potential energy
just after the achievement of its
take-off phase.24 If China is to
achieve its 2020 target of fifteen
percent of national energy generation from renewables,25 as laid
out in its latest (2006-10) Five
Year Plan, then these obstacles
represent serious challenges to
be faced before the end of the
decade. This is especially relevant in the case of those already
established projects, apart from
hydroelectric power, which are
expected to lead the renewables
generation tables: wind power,
for example, is expected to account for three percent of national
generation capacity by 2020.26 However, the identified obstacles
should be considered challenges, not market conditions that will
negatively affect the Chinese market in the long run. Indeed,
apart from these obstacles, the Chinese renewable energy market is exhibiting signs of vitality, innovation, and opportunity.
This article concludes by focusing, briefly, on these avenues of
future renewables development.

great majority of its turbine technology as well as components.27
However, by 2008, it had become an increasingly important
exporter and manufacturer of other renewable energy generation
technologies. Solar power is a case in point. China features several leading solar power and photovoltaic (“PV”) manufacturing
and project companies, active in the domestic as well as in the
international cleantech fields. For
example, Suntech Power Holdings (“Suntech”), a leading solar
power player, has been involved
in co-developing and investing in
several large overseas projects,
such as Elecnor, a thirty-five
MW solar power plant in Spain,
and Alamosa solar plant in the
U.S. state of Colorado, an eight
MW project. 28 Furthermore,
Chinese solar companies have
been engaged in opening up new
markets for their solar expertise, as seen in the construction
of Katsrin solar power plant in
the Golan Heights, Israel.29 The
fifty kilowatt farm is the largest
in the country to date, and was
constructed by Israeli solar firm
Solarit Doral, in conjunction with Suntech.30 It is where renewable energy technologies are currently in the take-off stage—
such as PV technologies—that Chinese renewables companies
can be best positioned to compete and gain advantage over
non-Chinese rival firms. Government investment in R&D must
be rationalized and increased, however, if niche technology
developments are to be effectively researched, marketed, and
manufactured.31
Secondly, China’s focus on large-scale renewable energy
generation projects provides a clear opportunity for the pooling
of large-scale project expertise; this will be increasingly relevant
internationally, as the focus on renewables shifts to projects with
larger generating capacities. China’s aim of generating thirty
gigawatts of installed wind power capacity by 2020, powering
between thirteen and thirty million homes at full capacity, necessitates large-scale, highly-organized project development.32
By 2020, the Chinese renewable energy project landscape is
increasingly going to feature large-scale projects, generating
more than 1,000 MW in capacity per project, connected to the
grid.33 The lion’s share of these projects’ generation capacity is
likely to come from hydroelectric power and wind farms, with
wind farms accounting for a majority of projects, at least in number.34 Furthermore, offshore wind farms featuring large-scale
wind turbines are going to be an increasingly important feature
of coastal renewable energy generation: in November 2006,
China’s first offshore wind facility, with a capacity of 1.5 MW,
was installed by China National Offshore Corporation using turbines manufactured by Xinjiang Goldwind. By 2009, work was

China’s cleantech
market, especially
in renewable energy
generation technologies,
is set to continue its
take-off phase and
gain altitude and
international traction.

Conclusion: Innovation and Opportunity
As argued above, the main obstacles facing the Chinese
renewable energy market are challenges to be faced in the
realms of policy, pricing, and technology development incentives and subsidies. In terms of sustainability, China needs to be
able to apply innovative policies to energy conservation and an
amelioration of the lived environment, especially in urban areas.
Landmark projects, such as those at Dongtan eco-city, mask the
fact that conservation and emissions reductions are priorities
which are secondary to continued growth. This focus on growth,
in turn, leads to a continued focus on a carbon-fueled economy.
However, there are some areas in which China’s renewables
market is exhibiting clear signs of innovation and leadership, as
opposed to reaction to market conditions.
One of these areas is renewable energy technology exports.
China is traditionally described as a net importer of renewable
energy technology, technical know-how, and project development capabilities. This is especially the case where established
technologies—developed mostly outside China—are concerned.
In the case of wind power, mentioned above, China imports the
9
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underway on large-scale offshore wind farms, including the 102
MW Shanghai East Ocean Offshore Wind Farm.35
The points made in this article show that, in the case of
renewable energy technologies within the Chinese cleantech
market, China stands at a paradoxical waypoint. On the one
hand, the Chinese context and market represent clear investment, development, and generation opportunities. On the other
hand, the policy and fiscal obstacles identified in the article represent clear problems which will slow down development and

sap the potential of this market—and of the development of
China’s energy system towards national 2020 targets—unless
they are faced with clear political will at a central as well as a
provincial level. China’s cleantech market, especially in renewable energy generation technologies, is set to continue its takeoff phase and gain altitude and international traction—unless the
identified obstacles are allowed to slow down or, in the worst of
cases, stall this cleantech trajectory.
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